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OF GARDENS AND STREETS: A
DIFFERENTIATED MODEL OF PROPERTY
IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
SPACE LAW
KaliN. Murray'
INTRODUCTION

Often, when I visit cities, I go to gardens. A visit to a garden works on many levels. You can walk on the trails and paths
that the landscape architect has deftly laid out. As you walk,
you can admire the beauty of the various things that make up
gardens such as the flowers, the trees, the vines, and other
flora. And once you leave the garden, you can recall its beauty
with pictures of the garden or a diary account of the particular
property. A key aspect, then, of the "garden" is your ability to
experience the pleasure of walking along the path, the pleasure
of viewing flowers, and the pleasure of recalling both of these
experiences. Your supposedly singular experience, then, is
really one of many discrete and overlapping experiences. While
you, a casual visitor, may be content to simply "visit" the garden, within a legal context, this choice may flatten important
distinctions between categories. Indeed, an important task of a
legal regime is the ability to differentiate between these diverse
"things" which may underlie a singular subject.
I begin with gardens, not space, the subject of this conference for two reasons. Initially, the metaphor of a garden serves
to "normalize" the treatment of space within the law. Often,
analyses of space law treat this subject as a separate area, in. Kali N. Murray, Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Mississippi School
of Law. I dedicate this Essay to my sister Alana D. Murray for all her love and support.
I thank the National Center for Remote Sensing, Air, and Space Law for the opportunity
to speak at the Conference as well as providing summer support for this project. I would
like to thank Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz and Jacqueline Etil Serrao for reviewing early
drafts of this Essay. Valuable research assistance has been provided by Misty Parks,
Loren Henagan and Chance Pearson.

361

362

JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW

[VOL. 32

dependent of standard debates in other disciplines such as
property and intellectual property. For example, the recent innovative scholarship as to "the commons" that has taken place
in both intellectual property and property discussions is largely
absent from the treatment of property in national and international space law. I think of this conference and resulting Essay
as the opportunity to begin a fruitful dialogue between space
law and a number of the more traditional disciplines.
The metaphor of the garden serves another narrower purpose. The garden reflects the way in which property law creates
a differentiated legal framework, which I argue below, would be
useful in describing how property should be treated within the
space law regime. The metaphor of a garden very nicely reflects
the different categories used to describe those "objects" in which
claims of property ownership are made. The garden I have described roughly corresponds to the categories we assign to regulated "things" in property. The garden itself is land or real
property;! the items contained in the garden such as flowers and
trees are chattels;' and the subsequent accounts could be copyrighted and are thus, fall within the category of intangible or
intellectual property.' This differing treatment is furthered by
the process of dividing the rights of users into a separate series
of categories, such as the right to exclude, the right to use and
the right to transfer.4 This so-called "bundle of rights" can have
1
Real property is commonly defined as land and generally whatever is erected or
growing upon or affixed to the land. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1218 (6th ed. 1990); see
also J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAw 105·111 (1997) (reviewing the distinc·
tions between the types of different objects of property).
2
A chattel is commonly defined as an article of personal property that is personal
and movable in nature. Two types of categories of chattel exist: (1) personal chattel,
which have no connection with real estate; and (2) real chattels, which are those interests annexed to the real estate. BLACK'S, supra note lat 236. Arguably, some ambiguity
exists as to whether the flowers, flora, other trees, would be classified as things annexed
to real property or to real chattel. For purposes of this discussion, I refer to these things
as real chattel.
3
Intangible property is commonly defined as property that is a "right" such as
patent, copyright, trademark or one that is lacking a tangible existence. Id. at 809.
4
While I will not discuss extensively in this paper, another way to differentiate the
treatment property is to distinguish between private and public spaces. The space itself
can be further divided by the "public" or "private" qualities of a thing. A space or thing
that is somehow is subject to multiple users can be defined as a "public"; a space or thing
that is available only to a singular owner or that whose use is controlled by that owner
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varying amounts of strength when applied to any particular object as Justice Stanley Mosk, in dissent, noted in Moore v. University of California Regents':
But the same bundle of rights does not attach to all forms of
property. For a variety of policy reasons, the law limits or
even forbids the exercise of certain rights over certain forms of
property. For example, both law and contract may limit the
right of an owner of real property to use his parcel as he sees
fit. Owners of various forms of personal property may likewise
be subject to restrictions on the time, place, and manner of
their use. Limitations on the disposition of real property,
while less common, may also be imposed. Finally, some types
of personal property may be sold but not given away, while
others may be given away but not sold and still others may
6
neither be given away nor sold.

What characterizes these property rights, then, is the ability to
have mutable, differential relationships, depending on both the
characteristics of the property itself as well as the right at
stake.
is defined as "private". Of course, such boundaries are complicated all the time. A "pri~
vate" space may accommodate public purposes; a "public" space may yield to private
uses. Here, I return to gardens, and one set of gardens, in particular, the formal gardens of Versailles. The formal gardens of Versailles demonstrate these potential dualities. While the formal gardens of Versailles were nominally constructed as a "private"
space for the King Louis XN, he often designed elaborate garden tours for tourists and
visiting dignitaries that reinforced and re-iterated his "public" power as the King. So,
the "private" roles of Versailles became intrinsically linked to "public" roles, thus dem~
onstrating the potential ambiguities in how we conceive of and subsequently attach
rights to, different types of spaces. Chandra Mukerji states that:
The importance of the gardens to Louis XIV's reign was underscored by the
itineraries written to direct visits to the gardens of Versailles. Some of the few
pieces written in Louis XIV's own hand were itineraries for promenades that
he penned for his own use on diplomatic occasions; the king wrote these guides
himself apparently because he placed great weight on the ritual tours of the
park. The promenades were formal affairs, at which distinguished visitors
were feted and entertained as they followed the prescribed paths through gardens. What they did and saw in these circuits was somehow meant to inform
their assessments of the king and his court.
Id. CHANDRA MUKERJI, TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS AND THE GARDEN OF VERSAILLES 9
(1997).
~ Moore v. University of California Regents, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 166-65 (1990).
" ld. at 166.
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This Essay is divided into two sections. As I view this as an
exercise in normalizing "space", Section I explores how the different treaties that comprise the international space regime
treat two key analytical categories-things and rights. By analyzing these objects in within space law regime, I hope to explore how a differentiated model of property illuminates tensions over property allocation within the current international
legal regime. Section II examines how a differentiated model of
property law in space will help us to "re-think" two key areas in
space: (1) the appropriateness of a de-contextualized treatment
of property; and (2) the usefulness of an overarching "commons"
principle in limiting potential broad claims of property in various objects. While a number of radical reforms have been proposed that involve wholesale privatization of space objects, arguably, recognizing the "differentiated" aspects of property
within space law would achieve a more nuanced perspective on
reform that takes into account the overall historical goals of the
international space regime.
1. A DIFFERENTIATED MODEL OF PROPERTY IN SPACE

After briefly analyzing the pre-occupation with territorial
claims of ownership (or the lack thereof) in the international
space regime, I first outline the basic framework of differentiated model, which places more importance on a wider range of
"property" categories than currently understood. I then examine two key categories-types of objects and types of rightswhich form the bases of a differentiated framework of property
in space. Finally, I examine how these categories could work
together to create a contextual understanding of rights that conform to pre-existing norms in property law.
A. Territorial Property in Space

The basic framework of international space consists of five
treaties', which constitute binding law and over seventy associ1
The five treaties are: (1) the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, T.IAS. 6347, 610 UN.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
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ated principles and declarations, which offer guidance as to the
content of national legislation.' Analyses of property in space
have usually focused on its most unique characteristic: its use of
a communal regime to allocate access to the territory of space.
Article II ofthe Outer Space Treaty provides that "[o]uter space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to
national appropriation by the claim of sovereignty, by means of
use or occupation, or by any other means.'" This statement,
commonly referred to as the "province of mankind" principle is
based on the theory of res communis. The theory of res communis provides that since the character of some common resources
is open to all by their very nature, exclusive appropriation is
Treaty]; (2) the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and

the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, U,N. GAOR, 22nd
Sess" Supp. No. 16, at 5, U;N, Doc, Al6716 (1968), 19 U.S,T. 7570, 1968 U.s.T, LEXIS
584 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement]; (3) the Convention on International Liability for

Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 961 UNTS 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention}; (4) the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer

Space, Jan" 14, 1975, art, II, U,N. GAOR, 29th Sess" Supp, No, 31, at 16, U.N. Doc.
Al9631 (1975), 28 U.S.T. 695, 1975 U.s. T. LEXIS 552 [hereinafter Registration Convention]; and (5) the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other

Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 77, U.N. Doc.
Al34146 (1980), 18I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter Moon TreatyJ. Widespread acceptance, of
the Moon Treaty, however, is limited. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Comment, Moving The
Heavens: Lunar Mining and the "Common Heritage of Mankind" in The Moon Treaty, 42

UCLA L. REv. 575, 583-592(1994) (examining the limited international acceptance of
the Moon Treaty).
8 Over seventy sets of declaration and principles exist related to space-related
activities. For the purposes of this paper, the most relevant principles and declarations
are: (1) Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, GA Res. 1962 (XIII), U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No.
15, at 15, U.N. Doc. Al5515 (1964); (2) PrinCiples Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites For International Direct Television Broadcasting, GA Res. 37/92,
UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 98, UN Doc. Al37/51 (1982) [hereinafter
Artificial Earth Satellite Principles]; (3) Principles Relating To Remote Sensing of the
Earth From Outer Space, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 115, U.N. Doc.
Al4lf53 (1986) (hereinafter Remote Sensing Principles]; (4) Principles to Use of Nuclear
Power Sources in Outer Space, GA Res. 47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992); and (5) Declaration on
International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and
in Interest of All States, Taking In Particular Accounts the Needs of Developing Countries, Ga. Res. 5lJ122, , U.N. Doc. AlAC.105/5721Rev. 1 (1996), Other sources of space
law include: (1) bilateral agreements between individual nations; (2) domestic space
regulation, such as statutes and regulation; and (3) case law, interpreting the scope of
international and domestic treaties. See Ty S. Twibell, Note, Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization and Development of Outer Space, 65 U.M.K.C. L. REV.

589,591-609 (1998).
9
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7 at art.11.
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difficult, and therefore, use and access is open to all.1O The
"province of maokind" of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is
often contrasted to the broader "common heritage" doctrine of
contained in Article 11 of the Moon Treaty. Article 11 provides
that: (1) the moon and natural resources are the common heritage of mankind; (2) the moon is not subject to national appropriation by use, occupation, or other means; (3) the surface or
sub-surface of the moon cannot be become the property of any
state, international intergovernmental or non-government organization, national organization, non-governmental entity or
natural person; (3) equal non-discriminatory rights exist as to
exploration and use of the moon; and (4) an international regime must regulate the common territory." The "common heritage" embodied by the Moon Treaty differs significantly from
the "province of mankind" principle contained in Outer Space
Treaty for two key reasons. First, unlike the province of mankind framework, the "common heritage" principle outlines a basic framework for extracting the resources. 12 Second, the "common heritage" principle dictates that any resource allocation
must be conducted on an equitable basis by an international
governing regime. '3 The "common heritage" principle, thus, goes
10
Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creations, 66 SPG LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 91 (2003); Gerald Torres, Who Owns The Sky, 19 PACE ENVTL. L.
REv. 515, 528, 529-532 (2002) (examjnjng the development of the res communis princi-

ple).

See The Moon Treaty, supra note 7 at art. 2 (1-6),
Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz and Jacqueline Etil Serrao, An Introduction to Space
Law For Decision Makers, 30 J. OF SPACE L. 227, 229 (2004); see also Ellen S.
Tenenbaum. A World Park in Antartica: The Common Heritage of Mankind, 10 VA.
ENVTL L.J. 109, 113-115 (1990); Joanne Gahrynowicz, Crisis of the Commons: A Turning
Point, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST COLLOQUIUM OF THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 31
(1988); B. Mairorski, A Few Reflections on the Meaning and Interrelation of Province of
Mankind and the Comnwn Heritage. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29m COLLOQUillM OF THE LAw
11

12

OF OUTER SPACE 58·61 (1986).
13 The strong principles of equitable treatment between developing and nondeveloping nations, which are the core of the "common heritage" principles serves as a
useful counter-example to recent trends in international intellectual property, which
have typically neglected the issues of equity within the development context. Margaret
Chon has argued that the international intellectual property should take into account
into equitable considerations, by utilizing a principle of substantive equality. Under a
principle of substantive equality, the "the decision maker should accord much less deference and exercise much more skepticism towards the proposed government action (in
this case, the regulatory intervention by the state in the form of the grant of intellectual
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much further than the neutral "province of mankind" principle
by providing for a more defined account of resources that may
result from exploring the territory of space, and moreover, providing for a governance model for determining how those resources will be allocated.
Use of each of these models has proven to be controversial.
According to critics, the failure ofthe two principles lies primarily in their perceived inability to secure private property rights
in territory to various commercial and non-governmental actors.
Legal uncertainty exists as to the scope of private territorial
rights because of the ambiguities contained in the "no sovereignty" langnage of Article II. Article II could be interpreted to
either allow a state to recognize extraterrestrial claims by asserting jurisdiction over its citizen's actions or to preclude all
private claims in territory, whether the claim comes from nation-states, natural persons, or juridical persons." As a result of
this ambiguity, territorial claims of private property are not accommodated and the subsequent failure to accommodate private
claims in territory distorts incentives to develop a range of resources from commercialized space travel to lunar mining. A
number of solutions have been suggested to resolve this perceived inability, among them: (1) amending Article II of the
Outer Space Treaty to eliminate the "no-sovereignty" cl ause15;
(2) allowing governmental entities to issue land grants or other
similar grants of interests in territorial space16; (3) creating a
system to register and license territorial claims17; (4) adopting a
free market approach undertaken limited by a defined regulaproperty protection) in the context of the provision of a basic human development capability, such as basic education or health care," Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and
the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2821, 2837 (2006).
14
Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, A New Hope for International Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles Into The 1967 Space Treaty For
Colonization of Outer Space in The Twentieth-First Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 299,
333 (2004) (citing Glenn H. Reynolds & Robert P. Merges, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF
LAw AND POLICY 27 (1989).
15 Twibell, supra note 8, at 63S.
16
Glenn H. Reynolds, Symposium, Environmental Rights and International Peace:
Outer Space: Some Thoughts on Structures and Relations, 59 TENN. L. REv. 729, 733
(1992).
17 Kevin Cook, The Discovery of Lunar Water: An Opportunity to Develop a Workable
Moon Treaty, 11 GEO.INT. ENVTL. L. REv. 647, 698 (1999).
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tory umbrella18 ; and (5) adopting connnon-law possessory concepts. 19
These proposals all share one common premise, namely, by
extending the ability of non-governmental (whether they be
public or private) actors to claim territory, claims as to other
objects of property-land, chattels, and intangible propertywill be strengthened. This premise, however, conflates the territorial approach embodied by the "province of mankind" and
"connnon heritage" principles to all types of potential objects of
property claims. According to this view, if territory is assumed
to be opened, all other objects in that territory are presumed to
be open. This premise is flawed. This premise presumes that
the principles as to territory to extend to all other objects in
which property can be claimed. Connnunal access to territory,
however, does not preclude all other claims of private property
in that territory. A more appropriate metaphor may be one
suggested by Carol Rose, who has proposed that a proper way to
conceive of this mixed regime is that of a street. In a street,
"there is public access but private property too. People stop to
chat with one another and with the street vendors. They laugh
at the pet monkey's antics, drop into a shop and buy something,
or have a seat and watch the other's pass by.,,20 Rose's account
of a "street" landscape suggests that connnunal treatment of
territory in space does not necessarily preclude that all other
claims of ownership. Any analysis of the property law of space,
then, does not end with the connnunal nature of territorial
claims. Indeed, the treatment of property in international and
national space law proves to be quite diverse if we look beyond
territory as the only object of property claims in space.

18 Lynn M. Fountain, Note, Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis
Produced by the "Common Heritage of Mankind" Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1735, 1772-

1781 (2003).
19 Gruner, supra note 14, at 345-354; Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20
Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 59, 98 (Fall 1999) (suggesting that space law must embrace the
principle of private property).
20
Carol M. Rose, Symposium, Introduction: Property and Language, or the Ghost of
the Fifth Panel, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 18 (2006).
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B. Chattels and Intangible Property in Space
Both the core treaties and subsidiary principles offer avenues for claiming property in chattel-type claims as well as intangible property claims. The importance of Article VIII for this
framework cannot be underestimated. This clause identifies a
range of potential property objects and more importantly, establishes a framework for establishing jurisdiction over a wide variety of objects. This jurisdictional element has allowed states
to recognize a broader range of property rights, such as intangible property through domestic laws. In a differentiated model of
property in space, Article VIII assumes an importance equal to
that of Article II in terms of defining the scope of property
rights. 21
1. Chattels As Objects of Property in Space
The Outer Space Treaty refers twice to objects that can be
classified as personal chattel (since these items are movable in
nature). Article VII refers to the "launching of objects" into
outer space. 22 Article VIII outlines a method of registering those
objects. 23 Article VIII identifies three types of potential objects:
(1) an object launched into space; (2) objects landed or constructed on a celestial body; and (3) the component parts of each
of these objects.'4 Later treaties have expanded upon these initial definitions. For instance, the Liability Convention and the
Registration Convention define the term "space object" as "in21
A number of recent articles have emphasized the importance of Article VIII for
establishing property rights in non-territorial objects. See, e.g., Henry R. Hertzfeld and
Frans G. Von der Turk, Bringing Space Law Into the Commercial World Without Sovereignty. 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 81, 83 (2006); Kelley M. Zullo, Note, The Need To Clarify The
Status of Property Rights in International Space Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2430 (2002).
22
Article vn refers to the liability assessed to one state party if the launching of a
registered space object causes damage to another state party or the natural or juridical
actors of that state. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. VII. An earlier version
of this clause was included in Section 8 of Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. See Declaration of Legal
Principles Governing the Activities of States, supra note 8, § 8.
211
Article VIII refers to the ability of a state to obtain jurisdiction over a space object
placed upon the relevant state registry. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art.
VIII.
24
Id.
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cluding component parts of a space object as well as its launch
vehicle and parts."" A number of national laws have incorporated the same definition of "space object" into their domestic
laws." A number of countries have adopted equivalent definitions that protect a broader range of objects. 27
The Outer Space Treaty also contains references to items
that can be classified as real chattel since these items can be
potentially annexed or attached to the land of a celestial body.
Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty refers to "all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and
other celestial bodies."28 This type of chattel is less frequently
referenced in subsequent treaties. Only Article 8(2)(b) of the
Moon Treaty refers directly to this type of annexed property."
The infrequency of reference to this type of property may be explained by the current difficulty of actually annexing items to
space territory.
2. Intangible Property As Objects of Property in Space
Three types of potential intellectual property rights can potentially apply to space activities: (1) patents that protect scientific and technical information; (2) copyrights that protect satellite broadcasts and remote sensing data; and (3) trademarks
25 See Liability Convention, supra note 7, at art. led); Registration Convention,
supra note 7, at art. 1(e). Article 8 (2)(a) of the Moon Treaty also refers to the abilities of
space parties to land on and launch space objects from the moon. See Moon Treaty,
supra note 7, at art. 8(2)(a).
26 A number of nations have adopted the same language for their domestic statutes.
See, e.g., The Outer Space Act, 1986, c.3S, §13 (England) (the term space object includes
"component parts of a space object; its-launch vehicle, and the components of that.");
605A Royal Decree 27811995, Establishing in the Kingdom of Spain of the Registry Foreseen In the Convention Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 2nd November 1974 (February 24, 1995) (Spain) (the term space object is "deemed to include both
component parts thereof and the launch vehicle and parts thereof.").
27 A number of equivalent definitions exist in other domestic statutes. See, e.g., The
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. 42 U.S.C. § 2452 (2006) (the term "aeronautical and space vehicles" means "aircraft, missiles, satellites, and other space vehicles, manned and unmarmed, together with related equipment, devices, components,
and parts."); Space Affairs Act, Trade Industry No. 84 of 1993, s. 1 (South Africa) (the
term launch vehicle means "any device manufactured or adapted to land a space:"craft").
2B
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at article XI.
2ll See Moon Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 8{2)(b).
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that may protect the naming of space projects and satellites. 30
Notably, however, these intangible objects of property are not
directly referenced in the text of the Outer Space Treaty or the
subsequent treaties. Of the relevant treaties, the Convention
Relating To Distribution of Programme Carrying Signals
Transmitted By Satellite ("the Brussels Convention") is the only
standing multi-lateral agreement that specifically acknowledges
the potential existence of intellectual property rights in a spacerelated creation." Article 6 of the Brussels Convention states
that "[t]his Convention shall in no way be interpreted to limit or
prejudice the protection secured to authors, performers, producers of phonograms, or broadcasting organizations, under any
domestic law or international agreement.,,32 While Article 6 recognizes the existence of potential intellectual property rights in
direct satellite broadcasting, Article 6 is still negative in its effect since it relies on domestic law or international agreements
to fill in the meaning of those rights.
Any protection of intangible property, then, has been the
result of two developments. First, Article VIII of the Outer
Space Treaty has been interpreted to protect those intellectual
property rights associated with a covered chattel. Under Article
VIII, a property owner can claim a corresponding intangible
property right under the relevant domestic regime due to the
nation's ability to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the

30
Leo B. Malagar & Marlo Apalisok Magdoza-Malagar, International Law of Outer
Space and the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 311, 350
(1999); see also Ruwantissa Abeyrante, The Application of Intellectual Property Rights to
Outer Space Activities, 29 (1), J. OF SPACE L. 1-20 (2003).

31

Convention Relating To Distribution of Programme Carrying Signals Transmitted

By Satellite, May 21,1974,1974 Lexls 269, TIAS 11078.
32
Id. at art. 6. The approach of Article 6 is also reflected in the Article H of the
Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International
Direct Television Broadcasting. See supra Artificial Earth Satellite Principles, note 8, at
art. H ("[wlithout prejudice to the relevant provisions of international law, States should
cooperate on a bilateral and multilateral basis for protection of copyright and
neighbouring rights by means of appropriate agreements between the interested States
or the competent legal entities acting under their jurisdiction. In such cooperation they
should give special consideration to the interests of developing countries in the use of
direct television broadcasting for the purpose of accelerating their national
development"). Notably, Article H ofthls Principle does include a focus on the equitable
redistribution of resources between developing and non-developing nations.
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listed chattel. 33 The intellectual property right, then exists, as a
subsidiary right that arises upon listing of an object on the register. National statutes that grant intellectual property rights
in items placed on a register typically contain an explicit jurisdictional grant. For example, Section 105 of the Patent Act
grants a patent in "an invention made, used or sold in outer
space on a space object or component thereof under the jurisdiction or control of the United States."" Section 105 reflects two
common limits contained in these national statutes: (1) the patent has to be granted on a space object or component of that
space object; and (2) the patent has to be under the jurisdiction
and control of the United States. The major flaw, however, of
this approach is that an intellectual property right will not be
recognized if the chattel is not listed on the registry; this potentially precludes a broader range of intellectual property rights
from being claimed.
A treaty or principle can also create a new property object
and that property object can become subsequently assimilated
into a nation's existing intellectual property regime. Take, for
example, the passage of the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Policy Act ("the Policy Act")" which referenced the definition of "primary data" contained in Principle I(b) of the Remote
Sensing Principles in its definition of "unenhanced" data." By
"' See Ex Parte McKay, 200 USPQ 324, 326 (1978) ( "It is clear from Article VIII of
said Treaty that jurisdiction of the United States in personam. over any person is present if the object launched into outer space is of United States registry. A patent grant
under 35 U.S.C. 154 by the United States for a process to be carried out on the moon by
personnel subject to its jurisdiction is thus not inimical and at variance with the indicated section of the statute."); see also Twibell. supra note 8, at 617.
"' 35 U.S.C. § 105 (2006). Notably, tbe language of Section 105 is broader than the
same contained in Article VITI of the Outer Space Treaty since Section 105 subjects
space objects listed on a register to the "jurisdiction" or "control" of the United States.
See Dan EurIr. Application of United States Patent Law to Commercial Activity in Outer
Space, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPo & HIGH TECH. L.J. 295, 347 (1991).
36 Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5601 et seq.
(2006).
aa Compare Remote Sensing Principle, supra note 8, at Principle I(B) ("The term
'primary data' means the raw data that are acquired by remote sensors borne by a space
object and that are transmitted or delivered to the ground from space by telemetry in
the form of electromagnetic signals, by photographic film, magnetic tape or any other
means") with the Policy Act, supra note 35, at § 5602(13) ("The term 'unenhanced data'
means land remote sensing signals or imagery products that are unprocessed or subject
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incorporating the Principles into its national law, a new category-data collected from remote sensing objects-then came
under the ambit of the relevant domestic intellectual property
regime. Such protection, however, depends on the scope accorded to that right by the domestic intellectual property regime. To continue with the above example, unenhanced data
does not receive protection under copyright law in the United
States because it lacks sufficient constitutional originality while
under the copyright law of the European Union it most likely
would receive a significant level of protection. 37
One central consequence results from this failure to develop
an independent intellectual property regime in space law. From
its beginning, the international space regime has emphasized
the usefulness of a unified framework in addressing the significant theoretical issues associated with the unique territory of
space and its associated resources. Now, because the approach
to intangible property has developed incrementally within particular national traditions, the overall space regime has turned
to local approaches to allocate resources. This only deepens a
commitment to a contextual approach to the treatment of property within the overall space regime. One nation could potentially grant stronger intellectual property rights to an item,
while another could potentially grant less intellectual property
rights to an item. Of course, these potential differences may
have been diminished due to the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafonly to data preprocessing."). See also Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Defining Data Availability for Commercial Remote Sensing Systems: Under United States Federal Law, 23
ANNALS OF Am AND SPACE L. 94, 98 (1998).
31
Compare Fiest Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51
(1991) (''Facts, whether alone or a part of compilation, are not original, and therefore,
may not be copyrighted. A factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an
original selection or arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular
selection or arrangement.") with Council Directive 96/9IEC, Art. 7, 1996 O.J. (L 77)
("Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which shows that
there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the
obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction and/or reutilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database.").
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ter to referred to as "TRIPS")" since TRIPS requires a minimum
standard for intellectual property rights protection. 39 The
minimal standard however, may not completely ameliorate the
possibility of different approaches. The rapidness of technological change that takes place within the context of space may
overtake the abilities of the international community to negotiate the varying demands of property owners and public users.

C. Rights in Property in Space
A differentiated approach to property also necessitates a
more nuanced understanding of rights in those property objects.
The rights of property owners as an object of property fall into
three categories: (1) the right to exclude others from using the
object; (2) the right to use the object in a socially appropriate
manner; and (3) the right to transfer the object. The strength of
these rights, however, will ebb and flow, based on how much
power, we accord to potentially competing public rights in that
property. Laura Underkuffier has argued that the power afforded these rights reflects two underlying conceptions, the
common conception of property rights and the operative conception of property rights. 40 The first, the common conception of
property rights, affords "the individual tremendous protections
against competing public interests ... [and, therefore these
rights] are presumptively superior to the public that oppose
38 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex Ie,
1869 U.N.T.8. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
89 [d. at art. 3 (''Members shall accord the treatment provided for ill this Agreement
to nationals of other Members."); art. 9 (outlining minimum standards of protection for
copyright); art. 15 (outlining minimum standards of protection for trademark); & art. 16
(outlining minimum standards of protection for patents).
40

LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 132-

34 (2003); see also Laura S. Underkuffier-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property,
IX CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 161, 182-91 (1996); Laura S. Underkuffier-Freund, Response,
Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1033, 1034-38 (1996). Underkuffier's
theory has been applied in a variety of settings, see, e.g., Susan Ayres, The Rhetorics of
Takings Cases: It's Mine v. Let's Share, 5 NEV. L.J. 615, 628-31 (Spring 2005) (discussing
Underkufiler's two conceptions of property in relation to takings cases); Lior Zemer, The
Conceptual Game in Copyright, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 409, 412-14 (Spring
2006) (explaining Underkuffler's two conceptions framework and its application to copyright law).
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them."4l Thus, the rights of a property owner seem to be inherently opposed to the rights of the public and in a dispute between the two, individualized property rights will usually trump
any expressed public goals. The second, the operative conception of property rights is a more flexible one. Under an operative conception of power, "collective powers to control are seen
as an inherent part of the initial configuration of ownership
privileges.,,4' An operative conception then accords less power to
any individual property right, by incorporating collective rights
into the initial allocation of property rights. 43 Underkuffier's
theory recognizes that the outcome of many debates in property
reflects the underlying theoretical conception selected by the
relevant decision-maker.
Underkuffler's account of variable property rights is consistent with a differentiated model of property in space law as the
particular strength of individual rights to exclude, use, and
transfer will vary depending on the relevant property object.
For instance, individual rights in territory are accorded little or
no value and must yield to a number of important public interests. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty does not simply require
access to territorial space but also states that access and use
must take place on a non-discriminatory and equal basis.«
These collective "use" rights to territory can be seen to act consistently with an operative conception of property in which
rights are seen as inherently collective from the onset. 45 By contrast, the rights to use, transfer, and exclude in intangible property objects, are stronger than those in territory. For instance,
a potential copyright owner has a right to prevent others from
41

42

~

See UNDERKUFFLER. THE IDEA OF PROPERTY, surpra note 40, at 132.

Id. at 41.
ld. at 62.

See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. I.
The corresponding right to exclude is diminished in light of these strong collective
"use" rights. As J.E. Penner notes "rights to purely exclude or purely to use interact
naturally, as it were, in the sense that use almost always involves some exclusion of
others ... So long as we conceive of a right to use in a social situation, in the real world,
that is, the implications of that kind of right will raise issues about the rightfulness of
excluding others, because the vast majority of the uses that a person will make of a
thing are impossible if everyone tries to use the thing at the same time. See PENNER,
supra note 1, at 68 69.
44
45

M
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using and distributing enhanced data under the current international space regime. 46 Arguably, it could be said that rights
as to an intangible property right are those typically associated
with a common conception of property. Of course, a number of
factors may complicate this claim such as the status of the intangible property within national law or the intrinsic characteristics of the intangible right itself.47
The sharp contrast, however, between the treatment of territory, on the one hand, and intangible property, on the other,
may over-simplify how all categories of property objects are
treated in space law. Often, a more nuanced account of these
rights will suffice. For example, the treatment of chattel placed
on land in Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty implies an ability for individuals to own the relevant chattel (thus, a corresponding right to a transfer ownership of that right), but then
subjects the chattel to significant public use and access rights."
Moreover, the rights of use and access are not unbounded. Article XII imposes a number of restrictions on this access, including: (1) reciprocal access to the relevant chattel; (2) reasonable
notice of the projected visit; and (3) reasonable safety precautions." This nuanced account of property rights demonstrates the importance of differentiating the type of property at
issue from the beginning since the subsequent assessment of
relevant property rights will depend very much on the type of
property at issue.
II. RE-THINKING PROPERTY: ADOPTING A DIFFERENTIATED
MODEL INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SPACE LAw

Adopting a differentiated framework has its limits. Space,
unlike a garden, or a street is a territory that is uniquely inac46 J. Richard West, Comment, Copyright Protection For Data Obtained by Remote
Sensing: How The Data Enhancement Industry Will Ensure Access For Developing Countries, 11 NW. J. INT'L & Bus. 403, 416-20 (1990) (reviewing the copyright protection that
attaches to enhanced data under national laws).
47
For example, the monopoly rights associated with a patent may accord stronger
individual rights to an owner than the lesser use rights associated with a protected
copyright.
48
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7. at art. XII.
49

[d.
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cessible to human exploitation. Moreover, space law, may resist
differentiation to the extent that it relies on a treaty framework
for its primary source of law. A differentiation process benefits
from the fact that common law can adopt a contextual approach
to issues as they arise; a treaty framework does not always provide the same flexibility. Despite these concerns, however, a
differentiated model of property in space will, perhaps, provide
a useful way to analyze tensions within the current space regime that have become apparent upon the increase commercialization of space resources. In this Section, I will address two
key consequences of adopting a differentiated framework. First,
I will examine the other types of treaties and frameworks that
have adopted a differentiated model in their treatment of property. Second, I will analyze the usefulness of a differentiated
framework to support a re-conceptualized "communal" principle
in the space regime.
A. Re-Thinking Context

Two treaty regimes usually serve as the primary models as
to the treatment of property in space: (1) the treaty regime that
regulates the use of Antarctica; and (2) the treaty regime that
regulates use of the deep seabed mining." Neither of these
treaty regimes, however, differentiates between the objects of
property claims. For example, the Article VII of the Antarctica
Treaty refers to a category of chattel outlining a right to inspect
"all stations, installations, and equipment" located on Antarctica.'! The term "inspect", however, implies a lesser type of license right rather than a broader right to use. Despite these
limits, notably, both treaty regimes have adopted approaches
which allow governing authorities to exercise jurisdictional control over property claims associated with nationally approved

50
See, e.g., Eric Husby, Comment, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space,
3 J.INT'L L. & PRAC. 359, 362 (1994) (discussing the importance of the Antarctica Treaty
regime for the development of the Outer Space Treaty); Hoffstadt, supra note 7, at 593603 (discussing the deep seabed mining regime).
" The Antarctic Treaty, arts. VIl(l) & (3), Dec. 1. 1959, 12 U.S.T. 764,402 U.N.T.S.
71.
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non-governmental actors." However, an articulated framework
that distinguishes between the types of potential objects remains notably silent.
On the other hand, TRIPS, the multi-lateral treaty framework for governing intellectual property, may offer a more relevant model for a differentiated framework in property in space.
The framework of TRIPs recognizes a range of objects subject to
property claims, including copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs and trade
secrets. 53 While protecting such a wide of range of objects has
created intense criticism", the usefulness of the TRIPS' models
lies in the way the treaty differentiates between the different
limits placed on right-holders. TRIPS offers two distinctly different types of limits on the right-holders. First, Article 8 provides two distinct principles that members may take into an
account when drafting or formulating relevant intellectual
property principles. Article 8(1) allows members to "adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition and
to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance.""
Article 8(2) allows members to take appropriate measures
"needed to prevent the abuse of an intellectual property rights
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology."" Other articles are to be interpreted in lights of these
general principles; therefore, these principles can be said to
52

[d. at art. VTII.

TRIPS, supra note 38, at art. 9(1) (protecting copyrights recognized under Berne
Convention); art. 10 (protecting copyrights in computer programs); art. 14 (granting
performers public performance rights); art. 15 (protectible subject in trademarks); art.
22 (protecting geographical indications which identify a good as a originating in the
territory, region or locality of a member nation); art. 25 (protecting new or original industrial designs); & art. 27 (protecting patentable subject mater in all fields, providing
that they are new, involve an inventive step and capable of industrial application).
54
See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANs. L. 614 (1996) (TRIPS imposes a Western notion of
copyright on developing nations); Donald P. Harris, TRIPS' Rebound: An Historical
Analysis of How the TRIPS Agreement Can Richocet Against the United States, 25 NW.
J. INT'L & Bus. 99, 102-03 (2004) (TRIPS undermines the sovereign power of the United
States to determine domestic policy and further undermines the specific public policy
goals of domestic intellectual property policy).
66 TRIPS, supra note 38, at art. 8(1).
ss Id. at art. 8(2).
oS
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temper these scope of the enumerated rights. Second, TRIPS
contains a number of limitations and exceptions that can be applied to a discrete set of objects, namely, copyrights, trademarks, and patents. Article 13, Article 17, and Article 30, all, in
varying degrees, allow members to enact laws that allow for
"limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights.,;;7 These three Articles, in particular, are examples of a differentiated notion of
property. These Articles only apply to those rights which are
afforded stronger set of enumerated rights. So, for instance,
these Articles are not applicable to other types of protected
rights under TRIPS such as industrial designs or trade secrets.
Moreover, the scope of the Articles differs. Article 13 only protects those limitations or exceptions that do not "conflict with
the normal exploitation of the work" and do not "unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder" while Article 30 permits a member nation considering the above interests,
to take into "account of the legitimate interests of third parties."" The variable strength of these limits emphasizes the
contextual analyses under TRIPS that result from the differentiated treatment of objects and rights in those objects.
TRIPS, then, is useful in that it suggests potential strategies that support contextual interpretations of property within a
treaty regime. General principles can apply to a broad range of
categories covered by the treaties; more specific limitations or
exceptions can be applied to specific categories. AB to the former, the international space regime, actually offers a useful
counter-example to TRIPS. General principles, such as the
"peaceful purposes" principle articulated in the introduction of
the Outer Space Treaty have been commonly viewed as an integral to interpreting the specific provisions of the relevant treaties; by comparison, this claim as to Article 8 of the TRIPS is
still relatively controversial. 59 AB to the latter, as discussed infra, the international space regime has not developed a sophisticated framework. In that, TRIPs can serve as a useful example
57
Id. at art. 13 (limitations and exceptions on copyrights); art. 17 (limitations and
exceptions on trademarks); & art. 30 (limitations and exceptions on patents).
58
Compare id. at arts. 13 & 30.
69 See generally Chon, supra note 13.
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given its careful account of the appropriate balance between
public and private interests.

B. Re-Thinking Commons
A differentiated model of property in space may also support a more sophisticated view of the underlying communal
principles central to the current international space regime.
Two significant interpretative distortions arise from a refusal to
acknowledge that the international space regime contemplates
variable rights in diverse property objects. Initially, certain areas of international space law may be developing in ways inconsistent with the overall communal purposes of the international
space regime due to the failure to openly acknowledge the differentiated aspects ofthe space regime. Over-reliance on different domestic regimes to articulate the boundaries of these property rights may create inconsistent, over protective approaches
to different objects.
I return to the useful example of Section 105(a) of the Patent Act. Section 105 allows a patent to be granted in any invention made, used, or sold in outer space on a space object or a
component of a space object." The inclusion of the terms "made,
used, or sold" has typically been interpreted to read Section 105
together with Section 271(a) which defmes the acts of infringement under the Patent Act.61 Recently, Federal Circuit consid"
erably expanded the extra-territorial scope of Section 271(a) in
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.," In NTP, the Federal
Circuit found that if the beneficial use of the claimed invention
is in the United States, a patent could be infringed even if a key
35 U.S.C. §105(a).
Burk, supra note 34 at 342·43.
"' NTP. Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Po·
tentially expansive extra·territorial interpretations have also been applied within the
context of 35 U.S.C.§ 271(f). See AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.2d 1366, cert.
granted, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct 27, 2006)(a master
version of software code transmitted electronically and replicated abroad constitutes a
component supplied from the United States, and therefore, violates 35 U.S.C. §271(f));
Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.23d 1325 (2005)(master version of
software code made in the United States, shipped on a golden master disk to be replicated abroad constitutes a component supplied from the United States, and therefore,
violates 35 U.S.C .. § 271(1)(f).
00

61
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component or step of the allegedly infringing product is located
or performed abroad." Under a generous reading of NTP, a pat~
ent claimant in a space object (such as a satellite) could assert
that the laws of the United States would apply since the beneficial use of the product was in the United States even if a key
component of the invention was located in space." Such claims,
by their very nature, may be potentially disruptive to the overall goals of the space law regime. For instance, significant proprietary claims on satellite technology itself could undermine
the principle of non-discriminatory access of data contained in
Article XII of the Remote Sensing Principles." Refusing to address differentiated aspects of property in space leaves questions such as these unexamined and is detrimental to the overall functioning of the international space regime.

(l.~ Id. (The use of a claimed invention is "the place in which the system as a whole is
put into service, i.e., the place where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use
of the system obtained.")
Go!
The United States is not the only nation that appears to be broadening its extraterritoriality concepts, see also Menashe Business Mercantile Limited v. William Hill
Organization, Ltd., RPC 31, EWCA Civ 1702 CA (2002), at Hll-12:
The claimed invention required there to be a host computer. In the present age
it did not matter where the host computer was situated. It could be in the
United Kingdom or on a satellite or elsewhere. Its location was not important
to the user of the invention nor to the claimed gaming system. In that respect,
there was a real difference between the claimed gaming system and an ordinary machine. It was wrong to apply the old ideas of location to inventions of
the type under consideration in the present case. A person who was in the
United Kingdom who obtained in the United Kingdom a CD and then used his
tenninal to address a host computer was not bothered where the host computer was located. It was of no relevance to him, the user nor the patentee as
to whether or not it was situated in the United Kingdom. Where the-host
computer was situated abroad and the tenninal computer was in the United
Kingdom, it was pertinent to ask who used the claimed gaming system. The
answer was that it was the punter who used it. There was no doubt that he
used his terminal computer in the United Kingdom and it was not a misuse of
language to say that he used the host computer in the United Kingdom. It
was the input to and output of the host computer that was important to the
user and in a real sense he used the host computer in the United Kingdom
even though it was situated and operated abroad. Thus, the supply of the CD
in the United Kingdom to the United Kingdom punter was intended to put the
invention into effect in the United Kingdom.

[d.
65

See Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 8, at Principle XII.
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Failure to appreciate the differentiated aspects of property
in space also leads decision-makers to insufficiently address
whether the co=unal approach articulated by Article II would
have any subsequent interpretative force for Article VIII. While
this Article suggests that Articles II and VIII outline variable
property rights in different objects, it remains unclear whether
Article II should serve as a "fIrst among equals", performing as
a basic normative principle that marks and constrains maximal
private property assertions in non-territorial property objects.
Again, reference to TRIPS provides a useful perspective.Margaret Chon argues that international intellectual property regime should adopt a substantive equality principle, based in
part, on the general principles articulated by Article 8 of
TRIPS." Under such an approach, a decision-maker will engage
a strict scrutiny analysis when an intellectual property right
conflicts with a basic development right such as a right to
health or education." Arguably, Article II could be used to play
a similar role within the international and national space law
regime in two signifIcant ways." First, using Article II, a decision-maker might determine that in a conflict between an
owner's asserted intellectual property right and wider public
use of the protected object, the goals and principles of Article II
protects the expansive use rather than the limited property
claim. Second, a decision-maker could argue that a domestic
legislative decision to expand an individual intellectual property
right broadly could amount to appropriative act under Article II.
However, use of Article II as a substantive norm would not
eliminate the existence of property rights in non-territorial
property rights. Rather, use of Article II could serve as a limiting principle that could constrain over-enthusiastic grants of an
intellectual property right at the nationallT regional leveL

Chon, supra note 13, at 2885-86.
Id.
68 The use of overall principles to govern interpretations of space law appears to be
a common practice. For instance, Ram Jakhu has argued that any appropriation of
space territory under Article II may also be governed by the general purposes outlined
by Article I, Paragraph 2 of the OST. See Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the
Global Public Interest in Outer Space, 32 J. OF SPACE L. 45 (2006).
6S
&7
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CONCLUSION

Hopefully, this Essay is the beginning of a fruitful dialogue
on claims of property within international and national space. I
have attempted to sketch out the basic contours of a differentiated model in property in international and national space law.
A nuanced framework is necessary in the international and national space law for two key reasons. First, a more nuanced
framework would be helpful to respond to the major changes in
technology that characterizes space law. Second, a more nuanced framework recognizes the flexibility of the treaty regime
itself to accommodate and respond to stronger claims of individual property. In this, space law may share other characteristics
of the gardens I mentioned at the beginning of this Essay; the
ability to change and grow in response to the needs of its users.

